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Fighting for 'Otherwise' (Mindfulness, Creativity and Language Education)

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Fighting for ‘Otherwise’ (Mindfulness, Creativity and Language Education)

Dr. Sayyed Mohsen Fatemi

Language and Consciousness

Regardless of the easy access to the repertoire of the first language in terms of semantics and grammar and the easiness of applying the lexicons to express the needs at least in rudimentary level, language users may sometimes experience their consciousness and mindfulness in spelling out what they tend to say. This may transpire when language users find themselves in a situation where they fail to mindlessly express what they want to say either because they may not have the words to display what they intend to convey or they may not generally know how to say what they want to say. This brings forth the emergence of attention or consciousness towards ways of expressiveness for the language users. It may be proper here to mention the concept of *understanding* in Heidegger's *Hermeneutics* where he distinguishes between understanding and knowing. Understanding, to Heidegger occurs when the person finds himself/herself in a state of practical belonging or connectedness with the object of understanding so he/she goes beyond *knowing about* the object and *understands* it in the sense that understanding turns out to be a mode of being. Here in our case, the person may feel that he/she knows the language and he/she rarely thinks about what he/she says as it often happens when people do shopping and ask for the price of what they intend to purchase. Nonetheless, they may be entangled, entrapped or stuck in a situation, condition, mood, or circumstances where they consciously seek to use the words and mindfully strive to employ sentences to articulate what it is that they want to say. According to Ussher (1955, p. 80) “The world as world is only revealed to me when things go wrong”. It is exactly in such cases when the person becomes so conscious of the language he/she uses or the significance of the type of language that he/she needs to hire to unearth his/her feelings, affects, ideas, opinions, beliefs, etc. For example, if some one plans to write a letter on an important or crucial issue of his/her life, or if one faces up with a situation where he/she engages in a defense, support and championship of what he/she assumes is brutally ignored by others, he/she may find himself/herself in a very sharp state of awareness and mindfulness in respect to the choice of the words, the arrangement of the phrases, etc. This consciousness does not necessarily warrant the production of a finely woven locution which is amazingly riveting in terms of style and opulently rich in view of content. The consciousness or mindfulness, however, cultivates the mindfulness for the user of a language to experience and understand the signification, of language and expression. In other words, when caught in situations where acknowledgement of the significance of language becomes necessary, one becomes more conscious of the relationship with the language one uses.

The same mindfulness or consciousness can happen in more sublime cases of expressiveness where language unfolds itself in the context of poetic, philosophical and scientific expressions. Here, the poet, the philosopher and the scientist may feel his/her connectedness and relation to language and his/ her mindfulness of the language. For, notwithstanding their command, their expertise and their mastery, poets, philosophers and scientists may undergo and encounter situations where they voraciously seek modes, avenues and forms of expressivity either in terms of form and style or content and substance.

This consciousness usually stands out in cases of second language where the language user has not yet gained the necessary dexterousness to express himself/herself. For the same reason, they may witness this mindfulness sooner and better especially if they juxtapose their position, at the time of expressiveness, in their first and their second language. Second language learners can easily connect themselves to their first language's resources where as they may experience some difficulty in regards to their second or their foreign language, at least in the early stages of learning.

The very consciousness can boil down to two major questions: 1. What is it that I want to say? 2. How should I say what I want to say? In other words, the questions find their way in both the content and the subject and the form and the style. The person in these states of consciousness can see himself/herself as the perceiver or the knower that perceives and knows his attempt to use language and yet he/she observes his/her need of language. The person can easily experience his/her consciousness regarding the above mentioned questions. We will get back to these questions shortly after we briefly discuss some of the theories and scholarship which in one way or the other deal with the key component of these questions, namely consciousness and expression.

According to German Expressivism¹, the act of expression is not something that can be added or attached to other human characteristics. Every thing that we do and every facet of our human activity, is a form of expression and a form of self-realization and self-unfolding (Markova, 1982, p. 105). Our realization happens in every single act that we do. This brings a distinction between Leibniz's *monad* and *expressivism* since in Leibniz's view, monads which are totally isolated, individual, "windowless" substances, move and develop in accordance with a predetermined plan by God. There is no interaction between the monads, yet, the changes and developments inside them happen synchronically based on God's prearranged plan so the changes within each of them synchronize with the changes and developments within other monads. To Leibniz, this holds true for the human soul being a monad too. Expressivists were in agreement with Leibniz so far as he postulated that monads are unrepeatable. Expressivists also maintained that every human being is unrepeatable. Their distinction from Leibniz, however, lies in their agreement with Kant that this is the individual himself/ herself who determines his/her own actions. Again, expressivists departed from Kant since Kant discussed the free action in the context of reason and excluded any other action which may

10. The term expressivism' was coined by Berlin (1965) and has been used by others such as Taylor (1975) and Markova (1982) to illustrate the movement against the prevailing rationalism. According to Markova(1982) expressivism was mainly characterized in artistic and philosophical modes.

come from irrational motives and desires, etc. Kant proposed that human rationality should determine the human freedom to act:

“So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine, own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only”. (Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 47).

Expressivists' departure point starts from the assertion that each person develops and unfolds according to his/her own code and there is not any universal moral code. This part may make expressivism some how similar to postmodernism. Through breaking the grand narratives and negating the universality of Truth, postmodernism, too, focuses on local, provisional and particular truths.

The emphasis on expression in its general term can also be seen in romanticism where consciousness of one's expression, one's action, one's past, one's history and one's childhood are highly encouraged.

Although Sir William Hamilton (1870) attributes the use of consciousness to Descartes and claims that before Descartes, consciousness has been used merely in an ethical sense, the word consciousness has been profusely used in its entirely philosophical senses by a large group of Islamic Philosophers such as Ibn Sina and Suhrawardi, Mulla Sadra, etc. (Ha 'iri 1992). Ironically enough, the issue of consciousness has been presented in certain circumscribed ways and has not received enough attention in the Western way of thinking: “Modern Western philosophy has, since its inception, been compelled to exclude certain claims of awareness from the domain of human knowledge, and to brand them as mere expressions of fervor or as leaps of imagination” (Ha 'iri, p.5, 1992). In defense of certain claims of awareness, Ha 'iri (1992) argues:”Yet, the exclusion by philosophical thought of these matters does not, ipso facto, prove the falsehood of these types of knowledge”. Ha 'iri (1992) brings philosophical arguments to substantiate a wide array of awareness including mystical experiences and particularly knowledge by presence by making a rigorous distinction between a knowledge based on the concept in the mind of something that is itself absent from the mind and a knowledge based on something which is itself present in the mind and whose very existence is inseparable from the knowledge of it. I will elaborate on this further when discussing knowledge by presence.

In the realm of psychology, consciousness has often been used to refer to one's knowledge about his/her experience, and the construction of reality. In line with this approach, John Locke defined consciousness as “the perception of what passes in a man's own mind” or, according to Ornstein (1972) consciousness consists in “subjective life”. In the meantime, Freudian psychoanalysis revealed specific domains where awareness is replaced by unawareness or unconsciousness or non--consciousness. Interestingly enough, one of the goals of psychoanalysis and Rogerian therapies is to “expand consciousness of our inner life” (Feshbach, et al., 1996).

Back to our questions, one can see that a language user needs to have an awareness of what he/she wants to say whether he/she is aware of this awareness or not. Even in stages of unconscious competence which may happen for a language user, he needs to have an awareness of one sort or the other otherwise he can not say or express what he /she wants to say. Arguably, he may be aware of one layer and not the other ones or some and not all or may be aware of some in the conscious level and unaware of some others in an unconscious level. In spite of a

large bulk of unconsciousness that may protuberate, there remains a part, albeit miniscule, which inescapably stands out in the conscious level.

Before we go further with this we need to again look at some of the distinctions that have been made in philosophy and cognitive psychology. Some Aristotelian philosophers made a distinction between what they called *potentia pura* or the fundamental activity to acquire an aptitude, *actus primus* or the acquisition of this aptitude and *actus secundus* or the utilization of this aptitude. Chomsky promoted this in linguistics with his introduction of competence and performance. Others such as Falvell and Wohlwill (1969) made an attempt to do the same in discussions of cognitive development. This distinction did generate various sorts of controversies both in theoretical and empirical spheres even by people who tried to use the distinction (see for instance Falvell & Wohlwill, 1969; Sternberg, 1985; Chomsky, 1965; Premack, 1979). According to Chomsky (1979), “linguistic competence (the knowledge of the language) constitutes only one of the factors in performance” (Chomsky, 1979, p. 84). He points out that “there is, first of all, the question of how one is to obtain information about the speaker-hearer’s competence, about his knowledge of language” (Chomsky, 1979 p. 18). In empirical aspects, the major question was: how do we know about competence if and only if the way to understand competence is nothing other than performance? As long as some one has not talked or written any thing, how can we ever have any access to the repertoire of his/her knowledge of language? In other words competence evaluation mainly relied on performance itself. As a reaction to these controversial discussions, some such as Goodnow (1985) viewed the distinction on the same continuum or put aside the distinction and spoke of moderators of competence.

Back to our discussion of the awareness of the language user, we obviously see that whether we agree or disagree with this distinction, or other distinctions such as availability, i.e. what one can do and accessibility, i.e. what one does do, some aspects of what the language user says is at the mercy of his/ her consciousness. In other words, the language user may come to recognize his/her consciousness of the language h/she uses. At this stage, it may be worth recalling Vygotsky (1962) and his discussion on the direct relationship between consciousness of one’s cognitive processes and one’s ability to control them. In line with this postulation, he focused on the conditions under which children ultimately gain consciousness and mastery of their own thoughts. So this may suggest that attainment or increase of consciousness can make a contribution to the mastery of thoughts and thinking. So, if this is the case, namely, if increase of consciousness can be of help to the language user, we need to see what this conscious raising or this mindfulness is.

Mindfulness and Language ²

According to Langer (2000) “mindfulness is a flexible state of mind in which we are actively engaged in the present, noticing new things and sensitive to the

² My reference to mindfulness and mindlessness is not to pose a binary or a dichotomy but is to point out how increasing effective mindfulness would result in enhancing our control of our cognitive processes. In the meantime, I do not intend to limit the scope of creativity to one realm or another since this is obviously in contraposition with the essence of creativity.

context. When we are in a state of mindlessness, we act like automatons who have been programmed to act according to the sense our behavior made in the past, rather than the present". On the detriments of mindlessness, the benefits of mindfulness and its implications, Langer (2000) refers to the experimental research conducted over 25 years and mentions "increase in competence; a decrease in accidents; an increase in memory; creativity, and positive affect; a decrease in stress; and an increase in health and longevity".

Langer (2000) argues that the majority of teaching and learning approaches harbor mindlessness. As our mindlessness increases, she argues, our creativity and the act of drawing novel distinctions decreases. It is only in mindfulness that we can look into alternative ways, and notice new and novel things. It is at the time of mindfulness that we can actively live in the present, situate ourselves in the moment and think creatively about perspectives and possibilities. On the contrary, it is in the mindlessness that we unquestionably rely on our mind-sets and ignore alternative ways. Langer challenges many of our beliefs about learning and argues that these are some of the mind-sets that have been mindlessly learned and work to our detriment. She recommends mindful learning and propounds its consequences: "The result is that we are then able to avert the danger not yet arisen and take advantage of opportunities that may present themselves. Teaching mindfully not only sets students up for these advantages, but has advantages for teachers as well" (Langer, 2000).

In the meantime, Langer (2000) indicates that mindfulness "leads us to greater sensitivity to context and perspective, and ultimately to greater control over our lives". Langer (2000) considers mindfulness as some thing that liberates us from our limitations and allows us to learn as creatively and openly as possible. On the other hand, she indicates that mindlessness is not only an impediment for novel ideas and distinctions but it is also imposing mind-sets "that have been mindlessly accepted to be true".

One of the biggest problems with classes of language and ESL lies in the promotion of prescribed ways of thinking. It is true that a student needs to learn the fundamental rules of grammar, speaking, writing, etc. in a language and in this stage he/she should merely or simply imitate the stream of the competent language user, but if this is emphasized as the only continual key to learn a language in all levels, it generates solely passive students whose vocabulary does not exceed the boxes of recommendations within the limited world of their teachers and their practices and whose ways of expressivity would contain strict manifestations of articulations. ESL students may often use adverbs such as 'actually' in an increasingly repetitive ways and even in contexts where there is not any need to such modifications. Also the verb 'make' may be used more profusely than any other word when it comes to a discussion or presentation of 'causative sentences' where as they have an enormous prism of options. The corner stone of the ESL students' sentences may often be associated with cliched ways of expressivity, too. The question, here, is: how much learning a new language brings students' familiarity with new ways of thinking, novel ways of reflection, and genuine ways of contemplation? If students' concern is only to remember what they are told to remember, how can they go beyond the paradigms of stuffed instructions? What can an ESL or a language teacher teach in this case except offering instructions whose violations would bring about being labeled 'wrong', 'incompetent', 'weak', etc.? Therefore what is the best way to achieve the emblem of 'competent',

‘fluent’, and ‘excellent’ except marshalling all forces to remember and remember the exact ways of the instructions and recommendations in so far as they pertain to speaking, writing, and of course thinking? If the whole attempt is used to recall, and recollect the instructors’ ways of saying and writing, then what happens to students’ experience of immediate consciousness when it is supposed to bring about students’ novelty, creativity and innovation? How can a student be connected to his/her immediate consciousness if his/her fear is not to remember what should be remembered from the repertoire of the teacher’s instruction? How can the avenues of creativity and novelty loom if teachers already prescribe travelling through only one or a few avenues?

Let’s look at some examples from “American Headway” by Soars (2001). The book is also used on teaching English to ESL students by some language centers and colleges. Under the heading of *Vocabulary and Pronunciation*, the book gives the following exercise:

Restate these sentences using not very. (P. 48)

1. Mark’s apartment is tiny.
2. Paul and Sue are stingy.
3. This TV show is boring.
4. Their children are rude.
5. John looks miserable.
6. His sister is stupid.

On the other section, *Listening and Reading, A spy story*, (p.22), the book reads: “who is James Bond? Write down any thing you know about him and share ideas with the class”.

Under the heading *Vocabulary* in another section on page 72, the book reads “Discuss these questions with a partner.

How long does it take from your school to the nearest train station or bus stop?
From your home to your work?

When did you last do some one a favor/make a complaint/take a photo/get angry?

What time did you get home last night?

Do you get along with your parents/your neighbors?

Is it easy for you to make friends?”

Having looked at these examples, it is now time to think of some questions such as:

How much does the cited material stimulate learners’ thinking? How much does the material invite students to think beyond the routine ways of thinking? How much does the material stimulate learners’ critical or creative thinking? What kind of discourse is promoted through these examples, ordinary or non-ordinary? If learners are frequently exposed to these kinds of discourses, what is the possibility of thinking about other sorts of discourses?

I do not intend to argue that we need to make our learners philosophers who philosophize every thing. Yet, I argue that along with attention towards everyday dialogue and conversation, we need to encourage students to connect to their power of thinking, to examine the relationship between discourse and self-construction and to look into self-construction, self-deconstruction and self-reconstruction through revisiting their languages.

According to Ghosn (2002, p. 175):

We should be careful not to retain the young EFL learners at the 'utilitarian' level of basic dialogues about mundane activities, or have them endlessly limited to the present tense. Yet, that is still a common approach in many ELT texts, including even the newer ones. Part of the reason for this, of course, can be attributed to the constraints imposed by publishers seeking to reach the wildest possible market for their materials.

Ghosn (2002) presents four reasons being respectively "motivation, language learning, academic literacy, and literature as a change agent" to use literature in primary school of English teaching. She argues "through the medium of literature, we can provide young EFL learners with language experiences that will not only motivate and foster oral language, but also deepen their awareness of the target language in its written form" (Gosn, 2002, p. 175).

While referring to the role of language teaching in critical thinking, she argues that teaching a second language based on some provocative thinking materials can help learners even establish more thoughtful relationships with their first language and help them foster the effective cognitive language development (Ghosn, 2002, p. 176).

Referring to the role of ESL teachers in encouraging students to think beyond the ordinary discourse and frequently habituated modes, Morgan (2002, p. 151) indicates that:

In terms of critical reflexivity, one of the issues that emerges in this case is how we, as ESL teachers, encourage students to view their role as citizens in a new political culture. For example, to what extent do we consciously or unconsciously (through our theories, methods, and materials) create a learning environment that suggests the meanings of citizenship are already determined for our students, and is their duty to accept them as is? Conversely, to what extent do we suggest these meanings are open to negotiation and (re) definition, drawing from the experiences that newcomers bring to a society?

While drawing on scholarship in the field of ESL, Morgan (2002, p. 152) claims:

the methods favored in many Canadian ESL citizenship classes tend to encourage political passivity. Instruction in these programs has often been preoccupied with the rote learning of "facts" and the stimulation of the question-and answer format used at citizenship hearings.

On the active role of language learners and the teachers' significant method of presenting the materials on awakening the ESL learners' power of thinking, Morgan (2002, p. 156) argues:

As students start to question "texts in the world", they also begin to question "texts in the mind". They come to recognize that they are not necessarily the sole authors of "commonsense" beliefs but are instead *subjects* produced through language and discourse. Such forms of understanding, from a poststructural perspective, are necessary to imitate attention and action on social inequalities whose persistence is sustained by their seeming naturalness.

To invite the language learners to go beyond the ordinary discourse and its insinuating modes of thinking, to question the questions and to revisit the answers, to help students to reexamine their horizons of thinking, to display the possibilities and their wildness and wideness, to locate and to relocate the position of utterances

and understandings, to think creatively and to teach critically would characterize a language educator who teaches language while cherishing thinking.

If learners are supposed to think inside the boxes, if they are to abide by the prescribed manners of expressiveness and recommended tables of thinking, and if they are to do their best to recall the rules of what need to be said and what need not to be said, how do they ever give themselves a chance to get out side the boxes, to escape from the mind sets, to connect to their immediate consciousness and to experience thinking away from the pervasiveness of the past engagements, and to express the gliding, unpredictable, and creative reflection within the crystals of language?

The capacity of human learning, the aptitude of human responses, and the capability of human process of information is not limited, contained or circumscribed in any way and can manifest within language in multitudes of known and unknown ways. What happens is that human beings get used to expressing ways that are recursively transpired and repeatedly occurred. In other words, we are used to hearing what we hear but this does not mean that the next thing we are going to hear in terms of content, form and discourse can be certainly predicted. The moment you liberate your self from the fetters of the ordinary discourse, you find yourself frolicking in the infinite meadows of expressiveness where your modes of expressiveness and your modes of thinking are not contained inside the boxes. The mere repetition and the sole replication of patterns and paradigms insinuate the exclusiveness of their validity and their indisputable reliability. The Modeling, the Classical Conditioning and the Skinner's Operant Conditioning are attempts to introduce the dynamics of the aforementioned repetition and replication and their impact on learning attitudes and behaviors. But what the codes and the rules or the recursion of the paradigms and styles can not by any means exclude or nullify is the creativity of expression and immediacy of consciousness. For although a sentence may be identifiable to a number of constituents and components whose linguistic translation may develop terms such as 'subject', 'verb', 'object', 'adverb of place', 'adverb of time', this cannot preclude the generation of creative expressions. In other words, the creation of meaning is not bound to those identified paradigms within the linguistic construction but it can unfold itself in infinite ways and manners. If a sentence in English, for instance, is constructed with the 'subject' first, followed by the 'verb', 'object', 'adverb of place', and 'adverb of the time' at the end, this cannot suggest a limited number of semantical constructions. To put it in another way, innumerable novel and diverse sentences with their ensuing meanings can be constructed and created within the same arrangement. Let alone the break of the same ordering that open up new patterns of orchestration as well. For example, the use of an adverb of place or an adverb of time or an adjective right at the beginning of the sentence either for emphasis or any other function breaks up the already cited sequence and gives rise to the placement of the constituent of a sentence in a variety of places. The point, however, in this stage is the availability and the possibility of meaning making through benefiting from the very inventive, the very creative and the very innovative gift of human being namely language. For example, the sentence "In Italy, they celebrate this day in June" is a sentence with the following characteristics:

In: Preposition

Italy: Adverb of place

They: Pronoun (NP)

Celebrate: Verb

This day: Definite demonstrative adjective

In: Preposition

June: Adverb of time

The adverb of place has appeared at the beginning of the sentence perhaps to lay emphasis on the place. The adverb of place could have appeared right before the adverb of tense. In this case we had the sentence: They celebrate this day in Italy in June. Now think of possibilities which may come for each component of this sentence namely in the very sentence what else can come instead of they? (eg. the people, the merchants, the aged, the librarians, etc.). What else can appear instead of celebrate? (eg. commemorate, observe, memorialize, hallow, etc.). You can do the same with the remaining parts of the sentence. The point is that these possibilities are by no means limited. So we can make infinite sentences with the same form while offering new perspective through each form. Our habits of hearing special utterances should not stop us from searching the unexplored modes of expressiveness. Creativity gives credit to these explorations.

The rejuvenation of all forms of language use, the revitalization of diversified manifestations of meaning making, and the revival of *otherwise* happen in line with the burgeoning transformation of language and its flourishing creativity. It is in line with this process of creativity and meaning making within language and through language and by language that Ricoeur (1990) propounds the emergence of a linguistic imagination beside an epistemological and political imagination which originates meaning through the living power of metaphoricity.

The idea of being creative in language is not just an idea of ornamentation to festoon the expressions through appealing non--vernacular devices. The most significant demonstration of this creativity of language and discourse can pour itself into the structures of thinking. In other words, a new discourse may promise the opening of a new way of thinking, a new way of examining the layers of reality. Any time an act of creativity is displayed, it introduces the implementation of a new perspective: seeing the familiar in the novel and the novel in the familiar. Yet, one may be too much stuck in the familiar so one may wear blinders that prevent one from seeing of the forest through the trees. Seeing every thing from a 180-degree angle may deprive one from examining things in other burgeoning horizons.

The horizons of thinking are manifested in language in that what is expressed somehow reveals the scope of thinking. So language is reflexive in this sense to the effect that it can expose the structure, the foundation, the composition, the configuration and the form of thinking.³ The creativity of language unfolds new

³ I need to acknowledge here that a group of social science scholars [see, for instance, Alvesson & Skoldber (2000)] insist on the point that if people say something, it does not necessarily mean that they mean what they say. My argument here is not in defense or defiance of such a claim. My point is that in either case, the saying, itself is revelatory regardless of the psychoanalytical

discourses that offer new ways of thinking just as the new styles of thinking open themselves in new discourses of language.

Now from an educational point of view, these are some significant questions: if students are given the chance to experience new and creative ways of expressiveness, does this allow them to experience new ways of thinking? If students are educated to connect to new ways of thinking, would they simply and passively abide by the pre-packed triggering systems of thinking which manifest themselves in the prevailing, and dominant ways of looking? (Think about the social and political implications of these questions.) What are the implications of looking into new things for language and thinking? What can language educators do in terms of creative thinking and language competence for students?

The language educators' excessive emphasis on forms and the correction of forms may overshadow the attention towards the other essential constituents of language and language understanding, including the conceptual, semantic and pragmatic aspects. Let's say that a student writes the following sentence:

Horses eat also.

The teacher may only focus on teaching the proper placement of 'also' thus correcting the above sentence into 'Horses also eat.' The teacher may keep on teaching the discussion on the alternative use of 'too' in such a sentence therefore teaching the possibility of the conversion of the sentence into 'Horses eat too.' He/she can also discuss the agreement of the verb 'eat' with the subject 'horses' teaching the other versions such as 'A horse eats' or 'The horse eats' hence opening the discussion on the requirement of 's' at the end of the main verb 'eat' in the event of the appearance of the third person singular subject i.e. he/she/it or their substitutes such as cat, John, the animal, etc. The teacher may also focus on the use of articles 'a', or 'the' with the singular noun of 'horse' versus lack of any articles for the plural noun of 'horses'. The discussion can carry on and cover issues such as the change of the form 'eat' into 'ate' and 'eaten' for the respective tenses of simple past tense, present perfect tense and past perfect tense with the introduction of 'eat' as an irregular verb in English whose other converted forms of the verbal conjugation do not accept 'ed' or 'd' (being idiosyncratical to the so-called regular verbs). If these emphases and similar points of concentration constitute the mere or the major axis of teaching, students are compelled to attend to the issues of formalism in the sense that they become concerned to use the right form where it is prescribed and to avoid the improper form where it is proscribed.

The essence of creativity and critical thinking begins with questioning and challenging the boxes of clinging habits, ordinary and every day discourses, memory's impact, and the interference of association of ideas. It is here when the new horizons of thinking powerfully beam, it is here where the spectrum of looking into things in a novel way glow. Creativity starts with a journey inside and outside the existing values, prevalent practices, pervasive approaches and common modes and exercises. It begins with questioning the flux of order, the arrangement of presentation, the apparition of the happenings, the manner of unfolding, the ways of showering, the moments of satisfaction, the pleasures of certainty, the avenues of solutions, the mansions of conclusiveness, the comfort of sufficiency,

questions to discuss its roots or the social approaches of discourse analysis to examine the veracity of its subject matter.

the impressiveness of suppositions, the forcefulness of associations, the obviousness of realization and the easiness of acceptance. Creativity challenges the way things are and explores other ways things can be. Creativity fights for otherwise. Creativity targets the unknown, the unfamiliar and the unexplored. It searches for mystery within mastery, the opening within the closure, the possibility within actuality, the passage within the blockage, the revolution within stability, the disintegration within integration, the decomposition within the composition, the indeterminacy within determinacy, the plurivocity within univocity, the imperturbability within perturbability, and the light within the darkness. Creativity rises in the midst of habituation, acclimatization, and familiarization and seeks novelty, exquisiteness, innovation and revivification. Creativity does not succumb to the deluge of ordinariness, commonality, platitudinous and conventionality.

Creativity of language and creativity of thought unfold and evolve dialectically and yet syllogistically. Creative thought harbors creative language and creative language nourishes creative thought. Creativity of language defines grammar, grammaticality and syntacticality in line with the creation of new rules, new openings and new perspectives. Creative language can open up the possibilities of seeing things in a new way. It can augur a change in the interpretations, a revision of the unquestionable, and a challenge of the well taken for granted premises. Creative language can offer re-description of things, subjects, categories, issues, people, and existence. In any act of creativity being epitomized in an enunciation or articulation, the act of redescription, and redefinition parade by virtue of a re—exploration of the consistent constituents of any compound or composition.

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